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INTRODUCTION 
In the world of capital punishment, the oft-repeated refrain “death 
is different” stands for the notion that when the state exercises its most 
awesome power—the power to take human life—every procedural 
protection should be provided.1 Every safeguard should be met. Granted, 
doing so makes the death penalty cumbersome. And granted, it slows what 
 
* S.D Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond 
School of Law. I thank Eric Berger, Joel Eisen, Jessica Erickson, and Jim Gibson 
for their comments on an earlier draft, and the Belmont Law Review for inviting me 
to participate in this worthy event.  
1. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (“As we have often 
stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and 
lesser punishments. ‘Death is a different kind of punishment from any other which 
may be imposed in this country. . . . From the point of view of the defendant, it is 
different in both its severity and its finality.’”) (quoting Gardener v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (because 
death is different, capital punishment may not be imposed unless “every safeguard 
is ensured”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“[T]he 
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, 
however long. . . . Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding 
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case.”). 
2021]    DEATH PENALTY EXCEPTIONALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 553 
Justice Blackmun famously called “the machinery of death.”2 But when the 
stakes are literally life and death, the idea is that we ought to make sure that 
whatever the state does, it does right.  
Scholars have lamented the way that this idea of death penalty 
exceptionalism has played out in the capital punishment context,3 but in the 
administrative law context, “death is different” takes on a new meaning 
altogether. In the administrative law context, “death is different” means 
suspension of the rules that ordinarily apply to administrative decision-
making. It means that when the state is carrying out its most solemn of 
duties, those subject to its reach receive not more protection, but less.  
The place that most clearly illustrates the point is the execution 
setting. Prosecutors ask for death sentences, and judges and juries impose 
them, but the people who actually carry out those sentences are corrections 
department officials—administrative agency personnel. The execution 
setting stands at the crossroads of capital punishment and administrative 
law. This is where to look to see what happens when the two intersect.4  
In this symposium contribution, I explore a little known nook of 
administrative law, examining how administrative law norms work in the 
execution setting—specifically, in the context of lethal injection.5 What I 
 
2. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the 
machinery of death.”). 
3. For critiques of the Supreme Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence, 
see, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections 
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 
HARVARD L. REV. 355, 397–402 (1995); Deborah W. Denno, “Death Is Different” 
and Other Twists of Fate, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1992); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for 
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); William S. Geimer, Death at any Cost: A 
Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards, 
12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985). 
4. This is not to say that the execution setting is the only place where 
administrative law and capital punishment intersect. For another prominent 
example, see Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? 
The Harm of Legislative Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525 (2016) (discussing 
administrative law in the context of death row); see also Richard A. Bierschbach, 
The Administrative Law of the Eighth (and Sixth) Amendment, in THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT 118–32 (2020) 
(exploring administrative law norms in the context of the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments more generally). 
5. For all practical purposes, the lethal injection context is the execution 
context. Every executing state employs lethal injection as the sole or at least 
primary execution method, and executions by lethal injection are how the vast 
majority of executions have been conducted in the modern era of the death 
penalty—that is, since 1976. See generally DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, OVERVIEW OF LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOLS, at https://deathpenalty
info.org/executions/lethal-injection/overview-of-lethal-injection-protocols.  
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find is death penalty exceptionalism turned on its head. Lethal injection 
statutes provide no guidance whatsoever to the corrections departments that 
must implement them. Prison personnel have no expertise in deciding what 
drugs to use or how to perform the procedure. And the usual administrative 
law devices that we rely on to bring transparency and accountability to the 
agency decision-making process are noticeably absent. The culmination of 
these irregularities is a world where lethal injection drug protocols are 
decided by Google searches and other decision-making processes that 
would be patently unacceptable in any other area of administrative law. In 
the execution context, death penalty exceptionalism means that the minimal 
standards that ordinarily attend administrative decision-making do not 
apply. Death is different, but in a perverse way.  
In the pages that follow, I substantiate this claim first by examining 
lethal injection statutes and the lack of guidance they give to prison 
administrators. Next I turn to a bedrock assumption of administrative law—
agency expertise—and show that when it comes to lethal injection, 
corrections department personnel do not have any. Finally, I explore how 
death penalty exceptionalism plays out in the context of administrative 
norms like accountability and transparency, discussing the secrecy 
surrounding lethal injection and administrative law’s role in maintaining it. 
I close with a few thoughts about the implications of this state of affairs for 
both the death penalty and administrative law, concluding that the result is 
not good for either.  
I.  LETHAL INJECTION STATUTES 
The discussion starts, as it must, with state lethal injection statutes 
because they are the mechanism by which states adopted lethal injection. In 
addition, they contain the instructions that state legislatures gave to state 
departments of correction (DOCs) for implementing it. To understand 
administrative law’s application to these statutes, it is first important to 
understand how remarkably little these statutes say. 
Lethal injection statutes are shockingly short. In Alabama, for 
example, the lethal injection statute simply says: “A death sentence shall be 
executed by lethal injection” unless the inmate elects otherwise.6 The 
statutes in Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Missouri, and Utah 
use the same or similar wording, specifying nothing more than “lethal 
injection” as the state’s method of execution.7 The statutes in seventeen 
 
6. ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2018).  
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.105(1) (2005) (“A death sentence shall be 
executed by lethal injection unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively 
elects to be executed by electrocution.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2016) (“The 
Director, or the assistants appointed by him, shall at the time named in the 
sentence…cause the prisoner under sentence of death to be electrocuted or injected 
with a lethal substance, until he is dead.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114 (2014) 
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other states use more words but they are no more specific. In Texas, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, and a dozen other states, the lethal 
injection statutes state only that executions are to occur “by intravenous 
injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause 
death and until such a convict is dead,” with slight variations in the wording 
here and there.8 In each of these examples, the state statute says nothing 
more than: “We want lethal injection.”  
For the record, saying more than this is not an impossible feat for a 
legislative body. A handful of state legislatures (six to be exact) have done 
it. Three states—Mississippi, Oregon, and Wyoming—have legislatively 
authorized the traditional three-drug protocol.9 Two others, Montana and 
 
(“For any person who commits an offense for which the person is sentenced to the 
punishment of death, the method for carrying out this sentence shall be by lethal 
injection.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (1995) (“A person convicted of a capital 
crime and having imposed upon him the sentence of death shall suffer the penalty 
by electrocution or, at the election of the person, lethal injection”); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 546.720 (2007) (“The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by 
the administration of lethal gas or by means of the administration of lethal 
injection.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(1)(a) (2015) (“When a defendant is 
convicted of a capital felony and the judgment of death has been imposed, lethal 
intravenous injection is the method of execution.”). 
8. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (West 2014) 
(“Whenever the sentence of death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence 
shall be executed…by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal 
quantity sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
22, § 1014 (2016) (“The punishment of death shall be carried out by the 
administration of a lethal quantity of a drug or drugs until death.”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (West 2001) (“[A] death sentence shall be executed by 
causing the application to the person, upon whom the sentence was imposed, of a 
lethal injection of a drug or combination of drugs of sufficient dosage to quickly 
and painlessly cause death. The application of the drug or combination of drugs 
shall be continued until the person is dead.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38 (2010) 
(“All persons who have been convicted of a capital offense and have had imposed 
upon them a sentence of death shall suffer such punishment by lethal injection. 
Lethal injection is the continuous intravenous injection of a substance or substances 
sufficient to cause death into the body of the person sentenced to death until such 
person is dead.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (West 1998) (“[E]very death 
sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous injection of a substance or 
combination of substances sufficient to cause death. The lethal injection shall 
continue until the prisoner is dead.”). For more examples, see LA. STAT. § 15:569 
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) 
(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.355 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 
2016); IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(a) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.180 (1996); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15-188 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2008). 
9. The traditional three-drug protocol calls for a barbiturate to render the 
inmate insensate, followed by a paralytic to induce paralysis, followed by 
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Pennsylvania, have legislatively chosen a two-drug protocol.10 And one 
state—Arkansas—has legislatively chosen a one-drug protocol, the same 
protocol that veterinarians use to euthanize pets.11 State legislatures can do 
more than just choose lethal injection. They can provide the most basic 
contours of what that means by deciding the number of drugs in the 
protocol and the type of drugs to use. By and large, they just have not done 
so.  
Curiously, states have done so in the animal euthanasia context. 
When it comes to animal euthanasia, most states have a law on the books 
specifying the drugs that can be used, or at least the drugs that cannot be.12 
This brings to mind one of the great ironies of the traditional three-drug 
 
potassium chloride to stop the heart and induce death. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-51 (2011) (“The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by the 
sequential intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of the following 
substances: (a) an appropriate anesthetic or sedative; (b) a chemical paralytic agent; 
and (c) potassium chloride, or other similarly effective substance, until death is 
pronounced….”); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (2017) (“The punishment of death 
shall be inflicted by the intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultra-
short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent and 
potassium chloride or other equally effective substance sufficient to cause death.”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904 (2012) (“When a sentence of death is imposed by the 
court in any criminal case, the punishment of death shall be executed by the 
administration of a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an ultra-
short-acting barbiturate, alone or in combination with a chemical paralytic agent 
and potassium chloride, or other equally effective substance or substances 
sufficient to cause death, until death is pronounced….”). 
10. The two-drug protocol omits the third drug, sodium chloride, which is 
used to stop the heart. Interestingly, the protocols in both of these states actually 
employ the three-drug protocol instead. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) 
(1999) (“The punishment of death must be inflicted by administration of a 
continuous, intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an ultra-fast-acting 
barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until a coroner or deputy 
coroner pronounces that the defendant is dead.”); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 
(2009) (“The death penalty shall be inflicted by injecting the convict with a 
continuous intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting 
barbiturate in combination with chemical paralytic agents approved by the 
department until death is pronounced by the coroner.”); Eric Berger, Lethal 
Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
259, 303 (2009) (“Several state statutes…refer only to a barbiturate and paralytic, 
leaving out reference to potassium chloride, even though the protocol in practice 
does include potassium.”). 
11. The one-drug protocol is an overdose of a barbiturate. See ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-4-617(a)–(c) (2019). 
12. For a detailed discussion of these statutes, see Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the 
Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 817 (2008). A detailed listing of the statutes themselves appears at id., 
appendix II. 
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lethal injection protocol—it uses a paralytic that most states prohibit for use 
in putting down pets.13 But the point here is less about the substance of 
these animal euthanasia statutes and more about the fact that these statutes 
have substance. They designate the drugs. Indeed, over a dozen death 
penalty states have both a generic lethal injection statute that says nothing 
about the drugs and a specific animal euthanasia statute that specifies the 
drugs that can, or cannot, be used in animal euthanasia.14  
This dichotomy has not escaped the attention of death row inmates, 
who have used it to support some innovative legal arguments. In a case 
from Tennessee, for example, a death row inmate sought to capitalize on 
the fact that the state’s lethal injection statute did not specify the drugs to be 
used, while the state’s animal euthanasia statute did, prohibiting the use of a 
paralytic because it increased the risk of a torturous death.15 The inmate 
wanted his death to be governed by the animal euthanasia statute, so he 
argued that he was “nonlivestock” under the state’s Nonlivestock Animal 
Humane Death Act—he was an animal, after all, and he was not 
livestock—which in turn allowed him to argue that he could not be 
executed with the three-drug protocol because the protocol used a paralytic, 
and a paralytic was prohibited by the Act. The court rejected the claim, 
finding no evidence that the state legislature had intended for the animal 
euthanasia statute to apply to humans.16 Fair enough. But the fact that the 
inmate’s best bet was to sue as a member of the “nonlivestock” class is a 
testament to the intellectually embarrassing reality that the induction of 
death in animals has received way more legislative attention and care than 
the induction of death in humans, who (at least in theory) have 
constitutional rights protecting them from being executed any way the state 
wants.  
To be fair, state legislatures may have good reason for writing 
generic lethal injection statutes, even as they write specific statutes for 
animal euthanasia. Legislatures might want to give state DOCs flexibility to 
change lethal injection drugs as supplies become unavailable.17 Or they may 
not feel as though they have the expertise to decide even the most basic 
 
13. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 839–44. 
14. See id.  
15. See Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV, 2004 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 643, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004) (“Abdur’Rahman 
asserts . . . that the inclusion of Pavulon in the Department’s three-drug lethal 
injection protocol violates the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act . . . . He 
asserts that he is a ‘nonlivestock animal’ . . . and therefore cannot be included in 
the lethal injection protocol because TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-17-303(c) prohibits 
the use of ‘a neuromuscular blocking agent’ for the purpose of euthanizing 
nonlivestock animals.”). 
16. See id. at *6–8. 
17. See Eric Berger, Death Penalty Administration: A Response to Alexandra 
Klein’s Nondelegating Death, 82 OHIO ST. L. J. ONLINE 9, 14 (2020).  
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contours of a lethal injection protocol.18 Or they may view choosing lethal 
injection as policy-making, and all other choices as falling on the 
implementation side of the line, which has traditionally been considered the 
realm of agency decision-making.19 Or they may just surmise that just 
choosing lethal injection is specific enough given that this is all they have 
done with execution methods like hanging, electrocution, and death by 
firing squad. 
These are all cogent explanations, and they all have cogent 
responses. By and large, the question is whether we want corrections 
departments to have the flexibility to make up lethal injection protocols on 
the fly; whether we think corrections departments operating in the shadows 
have any more expertise than legislatures operating under the public eye; 
whether we recognize the number of drugs in the protocol as a policy 
choice in its own right; and whether we view lethal injection as different 
from other execution methods in light of the fact that the choice of drugs 
also determines the manner of death.20 In addition, one might reasonably 
question whether lethal injection statutes that say next to nothing are a 
reflection of any of these considerations, as opposed to just plain inattention 
and the ability to reap the political benefits of signaling support for humane 
executions without having to figure out what that actually means.21  
An in-depth discussion of these issues would take more time and 
space than is warranted here, so I save a more fulsome discussion for 
another day.22 Here I simply acknowledge that why state legislatures have 
passed generic lethal injection statutes is a story of its own. Legislatures do 
 
18. See id.  
19. See id. 
20. Hanging uses a rope, the electric chair uses electricity, the firing squad 
uses bullets, and the gas chamber uses cyanide gas. Lethal injection uses drugs, and 
unlike other execution methods, the particular drug combination  that it uses 
determines how an inmate dies. A one-drug protocol kills by a barbiturate 
overdose, for example, while a three-drug protocol kills by inducing cardiac arrest. 
See supra notes 9-11. The only comparable execution method would be the gas 
chamber, and there state statutes did not say ‘use any gas, just figure this out 
yourselves’—they made clear that execution by gas chamber meant execution using 
cyanide gas. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ca., 503 U.S. 653 
(1992) (denying certiorari to claim that “execution by cyanide gas was cruel and 
unusual punishment”); id. at 657 (J. Stevens, dissenting to denial of certiorari and 
discussing “the California statute requiring execution by cyanide gas [] enacted in 
1937”); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983) (denying certiorari to claim that 
“death by cyanide” is cruel and unusual); id. at 1240–47 (J. Marshall, dissenting to 
denial of certiorari and discussing state statutes authorizing death by cyanide gas). 
21. The lack of legislative history or hearings suggests the latter. For an 
extended discussion, see CORINNA BARRETT LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION: WHY WE 
CAN’T GET IT RIGHT AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT US (book-in-progress, on file with 
author). 
22. See LAIN, supra note 21.  
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what they do for a reason, sometimes several of them. But in the context of 
the current discussion, what matters is not the reason, but rather the result.  
The result is a sea of generic lethal injection statutes that delegate 
every aspect of lethal injection—what is to be injected and how—to 
corrections department personnel. Some state statutes do so explicitly, 
providing that “such execution procedure shall be determined and 
supervised” by the DOC, while others do not even say that much, 
delegation being the inevitable result of a statute that says next to nothing.23 
Either way, the point is that these statutes leave every iota of lethal injection 
decision-making to prison personnel. From the number of drugs in the 
protocol, to the type of drugs used, to the qualifications of the 
executioners—these and a host of other decisions that determine whether 
lethal injection is torturous or humane are left for prison personnel to figure 
out for themselves, with no guidance from the legislature on the front side 
and no guidelines by which to judge their decisions on the backside. Lethal 
injection is not just grossly under-regulated by state legislatures. In the vast 
majority of states, it is not regulated by the legislature at all. 
This brings me to the administrative law implications of these 
generic lethal injection statutes, and specifically, to the non-delegation 
doctrine. In theory, the non-delegation doctrine forbids the wholesale 
delegation of legislative power, requiring that any delegation of legislative 
authority be accompanied by an “intelligible principle” to guide agency 
decision-making.24 At the federal level, the non-delegation doctrine is 
notoriously lax (at least for now).25 But at the state level, where lethal 
 
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2002) (“Punishment by 
death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection . . .  and such 
execution procedure shall be determined and supervised by the Commissioner of 
the Department of Correction.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 2016) (“The 
punishment of death shall be inflicted by the administration of a lethal gas or by an 
intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to 
cause death, by standards established under the direction of the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation.”); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (2009) (“The director of 
the Idaho department of correction shall determine the procedures to be used in any 
execution.”). 
24. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(requiring that Congress “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized [to exercise the delegated authority] is 
directed to conform” and holding that so long as this is done, “such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”); accord Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. 
Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (“The constitutional question is whether Congress has 
supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.”).  
25. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting), joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, suggests some 
interest in enforcing the doctrine with renewed vigor going forward (“While it’s 
been some time since the Court last held that a statute improperly delegated the 
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injection statutes are found, the doctrine is more robust and “alive and well” 
(to quote the title of one prominent article on the issue).26  
Yet even if that were not the case—even if states required no more 
than an “intelligible principle” to guide agency decision-making—it is hard 
to see how these lethal injection statutes pass muster. It may well be the 
case that legislatures pass generic statutes that delegate vast swaths of 
decision-making to agencies all the time. Indeed, I assume for the purposes 
of discussion that this is true. But it is one thing to delegate vast amounts of 
decision-making to an agency, and quite another to delegate the entire 
thing. What, pray tell, is the “intelligible principle” guiding the 
implementation of lethal injection when all the statute says is “lethal 
injection”?   
This was the Arkansas Supreme Court’s point when it struck down 
the state’s lethal injection statute on non-delegation grounds in 2012. “A 
statute that, in effect, reposes an absolute, unregulated, and undefined 
discretion in an administrative agency . . . is an unlawful delegation of 
legislative powers,” the Court stated.27 It then went on to say:  
It is evident to this court that the legislature has abdicated 
its responsibility and passed to the executive branch, in this 
case the ADC [Arkansas Department of Corrections], the 
unfettered discretion to determine all protocol and 
procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used, for a 
state execution. The [statute] fails to provide reasonable 
guidelines for the selection of chemicals to be used during 
lethal injection and it fails to provide any general policy 
with regard to the lethal-injection procedure.28 
This is why Arkansas is one of the six states that do not have a generic 
lethal injection statute. Its judiciary required the legislature to actually 
legislate, and the legislature chose a one-drug protocol.  
Notably, Arkansas is the only state in the Union to have invalidated 
a lethal injection statute on non-delegation grounds, despite plenty of 
inmates trying. As Alex Klein notes in her work in this area, some state 
courts have rejected these challenges on the notion that corrections 
 
legislative power to another branch—thanks in no small measure to the intelligible 
principle misadventure—the Court has hardly abandoned the business of policing 
improper legislative delegations.”). 
26. Jason Iuliano and Keith Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive 
and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619 (2017). For a taxonomy of the various state 
non-delegation doctrines, see generally Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the 
Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999). 
27. Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Ark. 2012). 
28. Id. at 854.  
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department officials are better qualified to make drug decisions (a point I 
will turn to in short order).29 Other courts say that the Eighth Amendment’s 
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause provides its own limit on agency 
choices, which is true, but also proves too much—the Eighth Amendment 
always applies, so if that is enough to satisfy the doctrine, the doctrine will 
always be satisfied.30 Still other courts say that defining the basic contours 
of lethal injection is something that legislatures cannot “practically or 
efficiently” do for themselves, apparently unaware of the fact that 
legislatures have done it and survived just fine.31  
It may well be that the implications of a robust non-delegation 
doctrine more generally are quietly driving these decisions,32 but whatever 
the reason, what matters (again) is the result. Outside of Arkansas, the non-
delegation doctrine has had nothing to say about state lethal injection 
statutes, despite the fact that these statutes fail to guide agency decision-
making in any way. Non-delegation claims fail even though lethal injection 
statutes would appear to fit the doctrine like a glove.  
Such broad delegations of legislative power might not be so 
worrisome if those on the receiving end of the delegation—prison 
administrators—had the know-how to implement lethal injection. But they 
do not. Why that is so, and what happens as a result, is the point I turn to 
next.  
II.  AGENCY EXPERTISE 
The entire premise of the modern administrative state rests on a 
claim about institutional competency, and underlying that claim is an 
assumption of agency expertise.33 However problematic broad delegations 
 
29. See Alexandra L. Klein, Nondelegating Death, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 923, 955–
62 (2020) (discussing non-delegation challenges in state courts and the reasons 
they have failed); see, e.g., Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000); State v. 
Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 515 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). 
30. See Klein, supra note 29, at 955–62 (discussing non-delegation challenges 
in state courts and the reasons they have failed); see, e.g., Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 
1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
31. See Klein, supra note 29, at 955–62 (discussing non-delegation challenges 
in state courts and the reasons they have failed); see, e.g., Ex parte Granviel, 561 
S.W.2d at 514. 
32. See Berger, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
33. See James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 365 (1976) (“The premise that administrative agencies have a 
substantive expertise in their areas of regulatory responsibility was readily accepted 
by the courts and has become the basis of a considerable body of administrative 
law . . . ”); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in 
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1097, 1097 (2015) (“Expertise plays a starring role in administrative law. 
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of legislative power may be, those concerns have thus far been offset by the 
notion that agencies bring to the table something that legislatures cannot—
informed decision-making based on expertise. Expertise is by and large the 
raison d'être of an agency’s existence.34 It is also a primary reason that 
courts defer to the decisions that administrative agencies make.35  
As already noted, most states have a lethal injection statute that 
explicitly or implicitly delegates the implementation of lethal injection to 
the state corrections department, which means that responsibility for 
developing the protocol to execute an inmate falls to whoever is in charge 
of the DOC.36  The person in charge of the state DOC—the DOC director, 
or commissioner in some states—has no training or expertise remotely 
relevant to lethal injection. Neither do the corrections department officials 
who work under these department heads. Corrections department personnel 
may be experts in prison discipline and security, but lethal injection is a 
medical procedure (of sorts) and these people have about as much 
knowledge of what it takes to perform a medical procedure as your average 
person on the street. And that is just the procedure itself. Then there are the 
drugs that the procedure administers. Knowledge of what drugs to use for 
lethal injection requires expertise in the field of anesthesiology (or at least 
pharmacology), and corrections department officials do not have that either.   
Of course, it would not matter that corrections department officials 
do not have expertise if they could get it—if they could get an 
anesthesiologist or perhaps some other doctor in the know to tell them what 
drugs to use. But that is a problem in its own right. Medical ethics have 
long prohibited use of the healing arts for the induction of death, so doctors 
are rightly reticent to help in the first place,37 and that is especially true of 
 
Congress establishes administrative agencies and often gives them substantial 
discretion because it lacks the expertise and political agreement to resolve the 
policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory scheme.”); Wendy E. Wagner, 
A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential 
Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2023 (2015) (“Although the hypertechnicality of 
agency rules is a more recent phenomenon, the basic concept that the agencies 
should preside over specialized information is hard-wired into the design of the 
administrative state.”). 
34. See Freedman, supra note 33, at 363.  
35. See generally Wagner, supra note 33, at 8. For an example, see 
Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d. 326, 352 (Fla. 2007) (adopting a 
“presumption of deference” that “the methodology and the chemicals to be used are 
matters best left to the Department of Corrections”).  
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
37. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
OPINION 9.7.3 (2016) (“An individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the 
personal moral decision of the individual. However, as a member of a profession 
dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, a physician must not 
participate in a legally authorized execution.”). This is not to say that states never 
get doctors to oversee the execution process; they do. But doctors are reticent to 
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anesthesiologists. Anesthesiologists have to be board-certified to have 
practice privileges in hospitals, and the American Board of Anesthesiology 
has threatened to revoke the certification of any member who assists in 
lethal injection in any way, including advising.38 As a result, corrections 
department officials have an exceedingly difficult time getting specialists to 
advise them on how to kill with drugs.39  
The result is what Justice Stevens lamented in his concurrence in 
Baze v. Reez, the Supreme Court’s 2008 lethal injection case: “Drugs [are] 
selected by unelected Department of Corrections officials with no 
specialized knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or 
guidance.”40 Lethal injection scholar Debby Denno, who was watching the 
Baze trial, later wrote about the oddity of listening to the testimony of 
prison officials who were on the one hand articulate and professional, and 
on the other, palpably ignorant of the procedure they were in charge of 
 
participate and most front line executions are paramedics. For a more extended 
discussion of the point, see generally Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician 
Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11 (2009); LAIN, 
supra note 21, chapter 9 (“Doctors Don’t Want to Share Their Expertise”) (on file 
with author).  
38. See Anesthesiologists and Capital Punishment, AM. BOARD OF 
ANESTHESIOLOGY (May 2014), https://theaba.org/pdfs/Capital_Punishment.pdf 
(“[I]t is the ABA’s position that an anesthesiologist should not participate in an 
execution by lethal injection and that violation of this policy is inconsistent with 
the Professional Standing criteria required for ABA Certification and Maintenance 
of Certification in Anesthesiology or any of its subspecialties. As a consequence, 
ABA certificates may be revoked if the ABA determines that a diplomate 
participates in an execution by lethal injection.”). 
39. For a time, states employed the services of anesthesiologist Mark 
Dershwitz. Dershwitz served as a testifying expert for 22 states over the course of a 
decade, but one suspected that he did more than just testify, and that suspicion was 
confirmed in 2014, when he was caught advising Ohio on its protocol in the wake 
of the botched execution of Dennis McGuire. Dershwitz denied it, but emails told a 
different story, and he found himself at risk of losing his board certification with 
the ABA. An announcement from Dershwitz withdrawing from the field followed 
shortly thereafter, and requests for comment were met by the statement: “As 
requested by the American Board of Anesthesiology, I do not discuss lethal 
injection in any venue.” For the full story, see Ben Crair, Exclusive Emails Show 
Ohio’s Doubts About Lethal Injection, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 17, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/119068/exclusive-emails-reveal-states-worries-
about-problematic-execution; Expert Witness in U.S. Execution Cases Will No 
Longer Defend States’ Methods, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/expert-witness-execution-cases-quits-ohio; Annie 
Waldman, Key Expert in Supreme Court Lethal Injection Case Did His Research 
on Drugs.com, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/
key-expert-in-supreme-court-lethal-injection-case-did-research-drugs.com. 
40. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 74–75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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administering.41 Those officials were “the victims of legislatures’ statewide 
romance with lethal injection—the details of which are left to the 
imagination of ill-informed prison personnel,” Denno wrote, adding that 
“[t]his process does not seem fair to those on the lowest level of the 
political hierarchy, much less to the inmates who bear the brunt of such an 
irresponsible degree of delegation.”42  
A decade later, nothing has changed. In 2017, for example, lethal 
injection litigation in Tennessee led to a hearing that featured the testimony 
of two top corrections department officials. The state’s DOC commissioner, 
who had ostensibly chosen the drugs in the state’s lethal injection protocol, 
did not know the difference between sodium thiopental, a barbiturate, and 
midazolam, a benzodiazepine.43 Those are two different classes of drugs 
with two very different properties.44 And the warden, described by one 
media observer as “alarmingly ill-informed,” did not know the details of the 
lethal injection procedure he was responsible for administering, and had no 
idea what to do in the event a contingency might arise.45 Time and again, 
corrections department officials have demonstrated a shocking lack of 
understanding of the drugs in the lethal injection protocols that they are 
responsible for administering—and this is what they say after they have 
been prepped for testimony on the witness stand.   
To be clear, this lack of expertise is not entirely prison 
administrators’ fault. Law Professor Eric Berger, who has both litigated 
lethal injection as a practicing attorney and now writes about it as a scholar, 
makes an important point in this regard. Reflecting on his experience with 
the prison officials he encountered as a litigator, he writes:  
I did not come away with the impression that the 
responsible state officials were vicious people who enjoyed 
inflicting pain. Nor did I think that they had made the 
decision to ignore the Constitution and get away with what 
 
41. See Deborah W. Denno, Death Bed, 124 TRI-QUARTERLY J. 141, 160 
(2006). 
42. Id. at 150.  
43. See Liliana Segura, “Our Most Cruel Experiment Yet:” Chilling 
Testimony in a Tennessee Trial Exposes Lethal Injection as Court-Sanctioned 
Torture, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/05/death-
penalty-lethal-injection-trial-tennessee/. 
44. See Christine L.H. Snozek, CNS Depressants: Benzodiazepines and 
Barbiturates, in TOXICOLOGY CASES FOR THE CLINICAL AND FORENSIC 





45. Segura, supra note 43.   
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they could. Rather, I think the state had given some 
employees a difficult task for which they were mostly 
poorly qualified.46  
Prison personnel were “out of their depth,” Berger writes—they were 
“tasked with an extremely difficult job without the training or resources to 
even know where to begin.”47  
What, then, do prison administrators do when they cannot access 
the expertise to figure out lethal injection for themselves?  Anyone familiar 
with the workplace saying “sh** rolls downhill”48 knows the answer: they 
pass the job to someone else. They outsource it, if only because that is the 
only thing they know to do. 
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is what Oklahoma 
DOC officials did when their state legislature passed the first lethal 
injection statute in the country, and they found themselves tasked with 
devising the first lethal injection protocol to go with it. These officials did 
not know what to do, so they turned to the man who had advised the 
legislature—Jay Chapman, the state medical examiner, who once referred 
to himself as “an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them 
that way.”49 Chapman, as lethal injection scholar Ty Alper has written, 
“gave the matter about as much thought as you might put in developing a 
protocol for stacking dishes in a dishwasher.”50 Chapman just came up with 
the protocol. In a day. Off the top of his head. “I didn’t do any research,” 
Chapman later stated, adding, “I just knew from having been placed under 
anesthesia myself, what was needed.”51  
 
46. Eric Berger, Lethal Injection, Politics, and the Future of the Death 
Penalty: The Death Penalty and Lethal Injection: The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49 
U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 758 (2015). 
47. Id.  
48. Yes, that is actually a thing. URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urban
dictionary.com/define.php?term=shit%20rolls%20down%20hill (last visited Dec. 
8, 2020). See also TANDEM SPRING,“Shit Rolls Downhill” But What If There Was 
No “Shit” and No “Hill”?, (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.tandemspring.com/shit-
rolls-downhill-but-what-if-there-was-no-shit-and-no-hill/ (“Think of the common 
workplace phrase ‘Shit rolls downhill.’ Which, if you’re not familiar with it, simply 
means that the lowest ranking person in an organization nearly always gets stuck 
doing the task nobody wants to do.”). 
49. Max Kutner, Meet A. Jay Chapman, “Father of the Lethal Injection,” 
NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/jay-chapman-inventor-
lethal-injection-arkansas-592506. 
50. Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. (Online) (Mar. 3, 2008), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/dpc/2008.
Alper.harvardlawandpolicy.pdf.  
51. Jamie Fellner & Sarah Tofte, So Long As They Die: Lethal Injections in 
the United States, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 15 (2006), https://www.hrw.org/
reports/2006/us0406/ [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].  
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DOC officials in other states did not know any more about lethal 
injection than the Oklahoma DOC did, so the easiest thing for them to do 
when their legislatures passed lethal injection statutes was just to copy 
Oklahoma’s protocol, which is exactly what they did. “In developing a 
lethal injection protocol, [the Kentucky DOC] did not conduct any 
independent scientific or medical studies or consult any medical 
professionals concerning the drugs and the dosage amounts to be injected 
into the condemned,” the trial court in Baze concluded, adding, “Kentucky 
appears to be no different from any other state.”52 Chapman was right in 
saying of the 37 states that ended up adopting his three-drug protocol: “I 
guess they just blindly followed it.”53 Across the country, state DOC 
officials carelessly copied a protocol that had been carelessly designed in 
the first place. But given the enormity of task thrust upon them and the 
dearth of qualifications to go with it, it is hard to imagine what else these 
corrections department officials were going to do.  
A second example of the sort of outsourcing that has taken place as 
a result of DOC officials’ lack of expertise highlights the vulnerability of 
these officials to fraudsters who pose as experts willing to solve their 
problems for a fee. In the 1980s, state DOCs around the country began 
commissioning the services of a man who professed to be able to tell them 
how to conduct lethal injection—Fred Leuchter.54 Leuchter was a 
Holocaust denier who sold state DOCs a lethal injection “machine” that 
guesstimated lethal doses of the drugs based on what he had read about 
pigs.55 Even after Leuchter’s fake credentials came to light—his degree was 
in history, not engineering as he had claimed—and Leuchter was charged 
with criminal fraud, wardens shunned him in public but continued to ask 
him for advice on the sly, so desperate were they for someone, anyone, who 
could tell them how to conduct an execution by lethal injection.56 
For those who are thinking, that was the ’80s, surely they have this 
figured out now, think again. In 2006, lethal injection litigation in Missouri 
revealed that the state DOC director had delegated the details of the state’s 
lethal injection protocol to a doctor who had been sued for malpractice 
twenty times and had his practice privileges revoked at two hospitals.57 In 
 
52. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 
Div. I. July 8, 2005). 
53. Josh Sanburn, Creator of Lethal Injection Method: ‘I Don’t See Anything 
That Is More Humane,’ TIME MAG. (May 15, 2014), https://time.com/101143/
lethal-injection-creator-jay-chapman-botched-executions/. 
54. See STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74, 77, 86 (2002). 
55. See id. 
56. See Denno, supra note 41, at 148. 
57. See Nick Welsh, The Death Penalty Is Experiencing Technical 
Difficulties, THE PACIFIC STANDARD, June 14, 2017, https://psmag.com/social-
justice/the-death-penalty-is-experiencing-technical-difficulties-48729. 
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his deposition, the doctor explained that the DOC director “ha[d] no 
background in medicine” and thus was “totally dependent on me advising 
him what could and should and will be done.”58 This was a particularly 
acute problem because the doctor, who had presided over 54 executions in 
Missouri by this time, was dyslexic and “sometimes transpose[d] 
numbers.”59 “I am dyslexic and so . . . it’s not unusual for me to make 
mistakes,” he stated under oath.60 Astoundingly, the state of Missouri 
doubled-down on the doctor,61 fighting tooth and nail to keep him as its 
executioner. The state lost that litigation battle when a federal court ruled 
that the doctor could not “participate in any manner, at any level in the state 
of Missouri’s lethal injection process.”62 The doctor went on to serve as an 
executioner for Arizona and the federal government.63  
The latest trend in lethal injection outsourcing is exemplified by 
what happened behind the scenes of Oklahoma’s botched execution of 
Clayton Lockett in 2014. Readers may remember the highly publicized 
debacle—the execution was an agonizing 43 minutes long and featured 
Lockett writhing on the gurney, mumbling in a semi-coherent fashion, and 
repeatedly lurching against the restraints. Officials closed the blinds as 
execution witnesses looked on in horror; Lockett had awakened in the midst 
of his own execution, and the result was a grotesque display.64 
What readers may not know is how Oklahoma came to choose the 
drugs that it used in that execution, and that is where the outsourcing comes 
into play. Oklahoma’s protocol at the time gave the warden “sole 
 
58. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *5 
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Director 
Crawford indicated that he was confident in Dr. Doe I’s competence and expected 
that he would continue working in the execution process.”). 
62. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. 
Mo. Sept. 12, 2006).  
63. See Henry Weinstein, Doctor Barred By State Helps U.S. Executions, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-15-na-
johndoe15-story.html [https://perma.cc/UN9Z-Q3DM]; M. Kiefer, Doctor Banned 
from Executions in Mo. Now in Ariz., THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (July 24, 2008), 
http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/07/24/20080724de
athpenaltydoc0724.html [https://perma.cc/67R9-PU9U]. 
64. For a detailed account of Lockett’s botched execution, see Ziva 
Branstetter, Eyewitness Account: A Minute-by-Minute Look at What Happened 
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discretion” as to which drugs to use,65 but that was just the process on 
paper. The warden did not know anything about lethal injection drugs, so 
she was in no position to choose which drugs to use. The people who 
actually made that decision were the lawyer for the Oklahoma DOC and a 
lawyer in the state Attorney General’s office.66 “I didn’t write that policy. I 
didn’t choose those drugs,” the warden would later tell investigators.      “I 
was just—I’m told the drugs that’s gonna be used.”67 
Of course, these lawyers were not anesthesiologists either, so how 
did they determine that midazolam, a benzodiazepine, was an appropriate 
substitution for pentobarbital, a barbiturate, when the state’s existing 
stockpile of pentobarbital ran dry? “I did my own research, I looked on-
line, you know. Went past the wikileaks, wiki leaks or whatever it is,” DOC 
general counsel Mike Oakley told investigators.68 The internet had said that 
midazolam “would render a person unconscious,” Oakley stated, adding, 
“That’s what we needed . . . so we thought it was okay.”69  
Oakley had read somewhere on the internet that midazolam could 
render a person unconscious and thought that this made it an appropriate 
substitution for pentobarbital—which means that he did not know they were 
different classes of drugs, did not know why that was important, and did not 
know that there are different levels of unconsciousness, one that will render 
a person insensate to pain and one that will not.70 Had he done nothing 
more than read the FDA warning label for the drug, he would have known 
that midazolam is not approved for use as the sole anesthetic in a painful 
 
65. See Cary Aspinwall & Ziva Branstetter, Execution of Clayton Lockett 




66. See id.   
67. Joint Appendix – Volume II at 15, Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) 
(No. 14-7955), (transcript of recorded interview of Anita Trammell by Trooper 
Jason Hold and Trooper Kevin Logan). For the full interview, see DPS Interview of 
OSP Warden Anita Trammell, THE TULSA WORLD (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://tulsaworld.com/dps-interview-of-osp-warden-anita-trammell/pdf_7b6599c0-
60dd-5df4-a1c5-9184dbc3c90e.html [https://perma.cc/9Q4J-2NFC]. 
68. Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, Warner v. 
Gross, No. CIV-14-0665-F, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181271, at *6 (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 22, 2014) (quoting recorded interview of Mike Oakley and citing to DPS 
interview p.1543.).    
69. Id.  
70. See American Society of Anesthesiologists, Continuum of Depth of 
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procedure.71 Had he called a local pharmacy, he could have at least learned 
that midazolam and pentobarbital are different classes of drugs and that 
those classes have different properties, one that would produce anesthesia 
and one that would not.72 Had he picked up the most basic pharmacology 
textbook (the University of Oklahoma College of Medicine is right in 
town), he would have seen graphs showing that midazolam cannot render a 
person insensate, and he would have understood that it had everything to do 
with its class as a drug.73 Oakley did none of these things. He did not even 
keep a record of the websites he relied on in choosing the drug that the state 
 
71. See Midazolam Injection, USP, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfd
a_docs/label/2017/208878Orig1s000lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3LR-DEEX] 
(indications and usage at p. 15). 
72. Midazolam is in the benzodiazepine class of drugs, a class that includes 
Valium and Xanax and is known for its use in treating anxiety. Pentobarbital is in 
the barbiturate class of drugs, a class known for its use in inducing anesthesia. 
Barbiturates are much more potent than benzodiazepines. For a layman’s primer, 
see What’s the Difference Between Benzodiazepines and Barbiturates? 
https://www.springboardcenter.org/whats-the-difference-between-benzodiazepines-
and-barbiturates/ [https://perma.cc/FUF5-UFXU]. 




Figure 19.3. Dose response curves of barbiturates and 
benzodiazepines. The barbiturates exhibit a linear dose response 
effect. . . .  Benzodiazepines exhibit a ceiling effect . . . 
Benzodiapines administered by either route [oral or IV 
administration] do not produce anesthesia. 
 
GEORGE M. BRENNER & CRAIG STEVENS, PHARMACOLOGY 212 (5th ed. 2017); see 
also LAURENCE L. BRUNTON ET AL., GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE 
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 403 (11th ed. 2005) (“The 
benzodiazepines do not produce the same degrees of neuronal depression produced 
by barbiturates and volatile anesthetics . . . . The clinical literature often refers to 
the “anesthetic” effects and uses of certain benzodiazepines, but the drugs do not 
cause a true general anesthesia . . . and immobility sufficient to allow surgery 
cannot be achieved.”). 
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would use to end an inmate’s life.74 What lawyer, in what world of 
professional competence, does this?     
As just mentioned, Oakley did not act alone; he was working with a 
lawyer in the state AG’s office. That lawyer was John Hadden, and 
Hadden’s contribution was reading a transcript of expert testimony on 
midazolam from litigation over its use in executions in Florida.75 One might 
plausibly justify Oklahoma’s decision to use midazolam based on Florida’s 
decision to use midazolam, except for the fact that Florida was using 500 
mg of midazolam, while the protocol that Hadden and Oakley wrote only 
called for 100 mg.76 So did the lawyers think that using one-fifth the dosage 
of the drug did not matter, or did they just not notice that they were using 
one-fifth the dosage of the drug? The possibility that two lawyers could not 
even copy a dosage right is almost unfathomable. But the possibility that 
they would choose a dosage that was one-fifth that of the protocol they 
were copying—particularly when the drug at issue is the one that is 
supposed to render the inmate unconscious—is equally hard to fathom. The 
incompetence is breath-taking either way.   
In the wake of Lockett’s botched execution, condemned inmates 
challenging Oklahoma’s protocol claimed that the DOC’s decision-making 
was akin to “an approach one might expect of a high school student who 
waited until the last moment to write a term paper—not the approach one 
should expect of the State engaging in the taking of human life.”77 Whether 
even high school students would have done better is an open question, but 
one can say at least this: the sloppy decision-making of the state’s attorneys 
in this case would not satisfy the duty of care in any area of the practice of 
law. Not one.   
Having shared the various ways that corrections departments 
delegate the task of determining lethal injection protocols, I now pause to 
 
74. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 148–49, Warner v. 
Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. CIV-14-655-F) (direct examination of 
Michael Oakley) (“Q. And you may not remember this, but do you remember 
specifically what pharmaceutical or pharmacy sites that you went to on the internet 
for your own research?  A. “I don’t remember.”).  
75. See Joint Appendix – Volume II at 4–5, Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 
(2015) (No. 14-7955), (transcript of recorded interview of Anita Trammell by 
Trooper Jason Hold and Trooper Kevin Logan). Oakley told investigators that they 
did not reach out to the expert themselves for a consult because “as far as the 
dosage and the amounts that he testified to, he wasn’t going to say anything 
different on the witness stand here,” which makes Oklahoma’s adoption of 
midazolam at a dosage that is 20% of what Florida was using all the more 
unfathomable. 
76. See Aspinwall & Branstetter, supra note 65.  
77. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 58–59, Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-6244). And yet, the Supreme Court upheld the Oklahoma lethal 
injection protocol, just one execution away from being the second most executing 
state in the country. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015). 
2021]    DEATH PENALTY EXCEPTIONALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 571 
offer a few observations about it. First and most discretely, Oklahoma is 
one of the most executing states in the country (or at least it was, until 
mishaps like the botched Lockett execution forced it to put executions on 
hold).78 This is an example of what lethal injection decision-making looks 
like in a state that ostensibly knows what it is doing. Imagine what it looks 
like in a state that does not.  
Second, the sort of decision-making that we saw in Oklahoma is 
not unusual. We know from lethal injection litigation that as states have had 
to revise their lethal injection protocols, lawyers have taken on the task of 
figuring out what drugs to use.79 One gets the sense that prison officials, 
who are all too well aware of their own shortcomings in this area, are (as 
others have surmised) “relieved to rid themselves of this assignment.”80 But 
lawyers are no more qualified to be making decisions about lethal injection 
protocols than corrections department personnel.81 Lawyers lack medical 
expertise too.  
Third and finally, the lack of expertise that marks the agency 
decision-making process also marks the product of that process—the 
protocols themselves. Oklahoma’s problematic protocol is one illustration 
of the point, but others abound. Two states, for example, had lethal 
injection protocols in 2004 and 2006 that called for half the dose of the 
anesthetic to be administered at the start of the execution process and the 
other half at the end, after administration of the drug that induces cardiac 
arrest, and death.82 “It is nonsensical to administer any drug, and especially 
an anesthetic drug, to a dead person,” an anesthesiologist later said of the 
protocol, adding that the DOC “cannot possibly understand the function of 
the drugs if it believes this order of drug administration is appropriate.”83 
 
78. In the modern death penalty era, Oklahoma has conducted more 
executions than all but two other states, despite the fact that it has not conducted an 
execution since 2015. In the modern era, Texas has executed 569 people. Virginia 
has executed 113. Oklahoma has executed 112. See Executions by State and Region 
Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-state-and-region-since-
1976 [https://perma.cc/7FSW-Q87L].  
79. See Alper, supra note 50.  
80. Berger, supra note 46, at 751.  
81. See Alper, supra note 50. 
82. See Affidavit of Marvin Polk, North Carolina Department of Corrections 
Warden of Central Prison at 2, Rowsey v. Beck, No. 5:04-CT-04-Bo (E.D.N.C. 
Jan. 6, 2004) (describing protocol used in all 18 executions he has presided over in 
North Carolina); see also Declaration of Mark J. S. Heath, M.D., at 17, Patton v. 
Jones, No. 5:06-cv-00591-F (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (describing Oklahoma 
lethal injection protocol). 
83. Declaration of Mark J. S. Heath, M.D., supra note 82, at 4 (summary of 
opinions). Dr. Heath’s discussion of the point later in the document is worth 
repeating here:  
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As another example, Tennessee’s original lethal injection protocol just cut 
and pasted “lethal injection” over its prior references to “electrocution,” 
resulting in a lethal injection protocol that instructed executioners to shave 
the inmate’s head and have a fire extinguisher handy.84 In the world of 
computer science, the acronym GIGO—garbage in, garbage out—comes to 
mind.85 The quality of what goes into a decision-making process has a 
material effect on the quality of what comes out of it, and lethal injection is 
no exception to the rule.  
These are the consequences of the dearth of agency expertise, a 
problem no less acute today than it was forty years ago when lethal 
injection was adopted. When it comes to lethal injection, there are no 
experts. There are just people who do not know what they are doing trying 
their best to get the job done.  
As Eric Berger observes, “Administrative law issues get to the 
heart of what is wrong with many states’ lethal injection procedures.”86 
Thus far, I have pointed to problems of delegation and expertise. I turn to 
the problem of transparency next. 
III.  TRANSPARENCY  
Transparency is one of the “hallmarks of American administrative 
law.”87 Agencies are staffed with unelected administrative personnel who 
are not directly politically accountable, and transparency serves as a 
counterweight to this deficiency, ensuring that the public at least has access 
to information about what agencies are doing.88 If people do not know what 
 
The ODOC [Oklahoma Department of Corrections] protocol 
calls for the administration of thiopental after [emphasis in 
original] the administration of two doses of potassium chloride. 
As soon as the potassium chloride perfuses the inmate’s heart, his 
heart will stop beating and his circulation will stop. He will be 
dead. It is senseless to administer anesthetic to a dead person. 
That the ODOC does not understand that its second dose of 
anesthetic can serve no purpose in ameliorating pain suggests, 
once again, that the ODOC does not understand the lethal 
injection process. 
Id. at 17.  
84. See Segura, supra note 43. 
85. See GIGO, TECH TERMS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://techterms.com/definition/
gigo [https://perma.cc/Z7D6-ZGX6] (“Stands for ‘Garbage In, Garbage Out.’ 
GIGO is a computer science acronym that implies bad input will result in bad 
output.”). 
86. Berger, supra note 10, at 326. 
87. William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative 
Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (2009). 
88. See Berger, supra note 17, at 16 (“Agency transparency is also an 
important factor in determining agency accountability. If agencies operate in secret, 
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agencies are doing, they cannot very well petition their representatives to do 
something about it. In this way, transparency provides an opportunity for 
accountability that agencies otherwise lack.  
The importance of transparency in administrative law is clear from 
the various rules that promote it. State administrative procedure acts 
(APAs), like their federal counterpart, require agencies to provide notice of 
proposed actions that they are considering, as well as an opportunity for 
public comment, absent narrow exceptions.89 In short, they require some 
modicum of transparency in the decision-making process, while creating an 
opportunity for agencies to get input from the public and outside experts. In 
addition, state APAs impose record-keeping requirements on agencies so 
that their decision-making is subject to public scrutiny and judicial 
review.90 State Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) likewise promote 
transparency and government accountability by providing access to agency 
records, again absent narrow exceptions.91 Each of these devices works to 
promote transparency in the agency decision-making process, providing 
citizens with information about what administrative agencies are doing and 
the reasoning behind the decisions that they make.  
Yet here again, these features of administrative law are 
conspicuously absent in the context of lethal injection. Far from the 
transparency that marks the ordinary administrative decision-making 
process, state corrections departments devise lethal injection protocols 
entirely outside the purview of the public eye. The public does not see how 
decisions about lethal injection are made, so aside from a select few 
 
the people and their elected representatives cannot know what government is doing. 
Inadequate transparency, thus, undermines political accountability.”); Eric Berger, 
Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in 
Constitutional Decision-Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2065 (2011) 
(“Governmental accountability is premised on popular monitoring of governmental 
activities; if the people cannot know what their government is doing, accountability 
is severely compromised. The risk of inadequate transparency is heightened in the 
agency setting, where officials are usually unelected and where the layers of 
bureaucracy and technical nature of the subject matter often shield a department’s 
affairs from public scrutiny.”). 
89. See State Administrative Procedure Acts differ across states, obviously, 
but one can get a sense of their provisions from the Uniform Law Commission’s 
Model Administrative Procedure Act, which contains provisions on public access, 
record-keeping, and notice-and-comment requirements. See NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT, REVISED (2010), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home
?CommunityKey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d-8228-7f2b0112fa42 [https://perma.cc/Q5V
D-DL39]. 
90. See id. 
91. For a collection of state FOIAs, see NATIONAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
COALITION, STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS, at https://www.nfoic.org/
coalitions/state-foi-resources/state-freedom-of-information-laws. 
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people—the lawyers litigating lethal injection claims, a handful of 
investigative journalists, and a random law professor here and there—no 
one knows just how bad the decision-making actually is.  
States thwart transparency in the lethal injection context in several 
ways. First, a number of states exempt their corrections department from 
the reach of the state APA, while others exempt their corrections 
department from the reach of the APA at least when it comes to lethal 
injection.92 To the extent that corrections departments are not subject to the 
APA’s requirements in devising lethal injection protocols, they are not 
subject to the notice-and-comment process that serves as the primary 
mechanism by which agency action is exposed to public scrutiny, or to the 
record-keeping requirements that force them to show their work.93 Nothing 
to see means nothing to challenge other than the APA exemptions 
themselves, and those have mostly failed.94  
 
92. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9) (exempting agency action 
from the APA when it relates to “[i]nmates of prisons or other such facilities or 
parolees therefrom”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(12)(B)(vi) (2011) (exempting 
agency action relating to inmates in a correctional facility from the definition of a 
“Rule” under the state APA); MO. REV. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (2000) (exempting a 
“statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the control of the 
department of corrections” from the definition of a “Rule” under the state APA); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030(1)(c) (state APA does not apply to the department 
of corrections with respect to persons in the department’s custody or subject to 
their jurisdictions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604.1(a) (“The Administrative Procedure 
Act shall not apply to standards, procedures, or regulations promulgated” by state 
department of corrections regarding method of execution). For an insightful 
comment about corrections department regulations as “a kind of no man’s land” of 
administrative regulation more generally, see Giovanna Shay, Ad Law 
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 (2009). 
93. This also means that state corrections departments are deprived of the 
public comment procedure that at least in theory could provide valuable input, a 
harm of its own given the agency’s lack of expertise.  
94. See, e.g., Hill v. Owens, 738 S.E.2d 56, 59–60 (Ga. 2013) (compliance 
with state APA in promulgating lethal injection protocol is not required); Ab-
dur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (interpreting the state 
APA to not govern lethal injection); Conner v. North Carolina Council of State, 
716 S.E.2d 836, 845–46 (N.C. 2011) (holding that North Carolina’s lethal injection 
protocol is not subject to the APA); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 
432–33 (Va. 2008) (holding that Virginia’s lethal injection protocol is not subject 
to the state APA); Jackson v. Danberg, No. 07M-09-141 (RRC), 2008 WL 
1850585, at *1  (Del. Super. Ct.  Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware’s lethal 
injection protocol is not subject to state APA); Order Denying Temporary 
Restraining Order And/Or Stay, Hightower v. Donald, No.  2007CV135682, 2007 
WL 4355844, at *4 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2007) (“[T]he promulgation of these 
protocols regarding lethal injection by the [Georgia] Department of Corrections are 
not subject to the requirements of the APA.”); Middleton v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 278 
S.W.3d 193, 198 (Mo.  2009) (upholding statutory exemption); Brown v. Vail, 237 
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Second, states have cut access to information about agency 
decision-making in the context of lethal injection in other ways. One 
searches in vain, for example, for regulations governing the process by 
which a lethal injection protocol is chosen. There is no established process, 
and thus the decision-making that occurs is off-grid and in the shadows 
from the start.95  
Moreover, even when there happens to be a record of how a lethal 
injection protocol was chosen, DOCs routinely resist sharing it, citing 
security exemptions under the state’s FOIA.96 For example, in the wake of 
its 2013 botched execution of William Happ, the Florida DOC refused to 
answer questions about how it decided to use midazolam as the first drug in 
 
P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (lethal injection protocol is not a “rule” under the state 
APA and thus compliance with APA is not required). But see Bowling v. Kentucky 
Dep’t of Corr., 301 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Ky. 2009) (lethal injection protocol is an 
administrative regulation subject to the state APA); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 
79-80 (Md. 2006) (also stands for the proposition that lethal injection protocol is an 
administrative regulation subject to the state APA). 
95. See Leonidas G. Koniaris et. al, Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection 
for Execution, 365 THE LANCET 1361, 1412 (Apr. 16-22, 2005) (noting that neither 
Virginia nor Texas, states that account for nearly half of the nation’s executions, 
has a record of how it developed its execution protocol); Editorial: Virginia’s 
Execution Dilemma, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, March 3, 2016, at A12. (“In any 
event, capital-punishment foes do make a good point when they note that the 
choice of lethal-injection drugs is entirely up to the discretion of the department’s 
director. The cocktail is spelled out neither in state law nor in regulation. In fact, 
even the process by which the cocktail is chosen is not spelled out by regulation.”). 
96. Some states exempt information about lethal injection from FOIA by 
statute. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(i)(1)(C) (2013) (“[A] person shall not 
disclose in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act of 
1967…[d]ocuments, records, or information that concern the procedures [regarding 
lethal injection and its implementation].”); see also Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 929, 965 (2016) (“Many states design and implement their lethal 
injection procedures behind a veil of secrecy, which makes it extremely difficult 
for inmates to know how they will be executed. . . . Indeed, some states have 
passed lethal injection secrecy laws that deem execution procedures a state secret, 
sometimes explicitly exempting them from state Freedom of Information Act 
inquiries.”) (citing state statutes in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
and Tennessee); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Lethal Secrecy: State 
Secrecy Statutes Keep Execution Information From the Public, 38 THE NEWS 
MEDIA & THE LAW (Spring 2014), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
01/Spring_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/43XD-9RB8] (“In denying requests for 
information regarding the identity of drug and medical suppliers involved in 
executions, many states rely on existing exceptions to their public information acts, 
such as protections for individuals’ physical safety, certain law enforcement and 
prosecutorial information, and information related to ‘biological agents or 
toxins.’”). 
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its three-drug protocol, which it had piloted on Happ.97 “Those decisions 
are exempt from public record because they could impact the safety and 
security of inmates and officers who are involved in that process,” the DOC 
spokesperson said.98 It is a mystery how knowing the process by which a 
drug was chosen could pose a threat to safety or security, but that’s what 
the public was left with—that and a lot of questions. Did the Florida DOC 
review the relevant pharmacological literature? Did it consider other readily 
available, less risky alternatives to the protocol it chose? Why did it not just 
choose the protocol used for animal euthanasia? With no records or 
regulations to review, the answer is nobody knows.  
Third, the more recent phenomenon of delegating the decision-
making process to lawyers places a blanket of secrecy over the entire drug 
selection process. Having lawyers involved in the drug selection process 
means that the process is protected from disclosure under the attorney-client 
privilege and attorney work product doctrine.99 It means that the entire drug 
selection process is hermetically sealed from scrutiny—exempt from even 
the court-ordered discovery process. Critics say this is the very point.100  
Fourth and finally, state corrections department officials employ 
informal measures to prevent public scrutiny of their lethal injection 
processes. A prime example is what happened when Louisiana’s chief legal 
counsel for the DOC reached out to the Texas DOC for guidance on lethal 
injection in 2003.101 Lacking access to experts, state DOCs have historically 
gone to each other for advice, and Texas, being the nationwide leader in 
executions, has played an outsized role in this regard. Over time, numerous 
state corrections department officials have consulted the Texas DOC in 
developing their own lethal injection protocols,102 and lethal injection 
litigation in Louisiana showed what these sorts of consultations look like. In 
the Louisiana litigation, the state’s counsel for the DOC testified that when 
she reached out to Texas, the warden refused to advise her over the phone, 
explaining that “he didn’t say these things on the phone that he would 
rather say in person.” That phone call led to a trip to Texas, and when 
Louisiana’s counsel and her entourage met with the warden, he “asked if 
 
97. See Tasneem Nashrulla, What 13 States Aren’t Telling You About How 




99. See Alper, supra note 50. 
100. See id. (discussing the “‘stick a lawyer in the room’ strategy” in states’ 
quest for lethal injection secrecy). 
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 16. 
102. At the very least, state corrections department officials from Colorado, 
Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming have 
consulted with Texas corrections department officials about lethal injection. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 16, n.52. 
2021]    DEATH PENALTY EXCEPTIONALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 577 
any of us had tape recorders, if any of us were wired” before discussing his 
approach to lethal injection.103 The Texas warden’s approach to lethal 
injection on the merits is a story of its own104—but here the point is the 
lengths to which Texas officials went to keep their information secret.  
We have glimpses of the steps that state DOCs take to protect their 
decision-making processes from scrutiny—the lack of information is more 
than just exemption from state APA requirements and a lack of records and 
regulations. But by and large, the best indication of these efforts is their 
success. Outside of the litigation context, which has slowly chipped away at 
the wall of secrecy that state DOCs have built, the result is a complete 
blackout of information.  
It is worth noting that the measures that corrections departments 
take to protect their decision-making processes occur against a backdrop of 
secrecy in the lethal injection context more generally. Secrecy as to drug 
suppliers.105 Secrecy as to executioners’ basic qualifications.106 Secrecy as 
to the protocols themselves.107 “[T]he only overarching constant appears to 
 
103. Id. at 16.  
104. For the rest of the story, see LAIN, supra note 21. 
105. See Robin Konrad, Behind the Curtain: Secrecy and the Death Penalty in 
the United States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://files.death
penaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/SecrecyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3FF-GCL
A]; see also infra note 106. 
106. See id.; Dahlia Lithwick, The Capital Punishment Cover-Up, SLATE 
MAG. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/capital-
punishment-cover-up-virginia-hides-all-information-relating-to-the-execution-
process.html [https://perma.cc/HYL2-5SGD] (“Amid the recent rash of high-
profile screw-ups in executions, new cover-up measures have been passed in more 
than a dozen states, allowing departments of corrections to increasingly refuse to 
disclose where their drugs come from, how and if they were tested, and whether 
corrections officers are qualified to administer them correctly.”); Death Penalty 
Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution 108B, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (2015), 
https://www.in.gov/ipdc/files/ABA%20Report%20-%20Execution%20protocol%2
0-108B.pdf [https://perma.cc/U58R-F6J9] (“In the modern era of capital 
punishment, secrecy has surround many aspects of the imposition of a death 
sentence in the United States. States have sought to shield not just the identities of 
executioners and other members of the execution team, but the details of those 
individuals’ basic qualifications, pertinent information about the drug formulas 
used in lethal injections, and the protocols that instruct how the execution is to be 
carried out.”); see also infra note 107. 
107. See supra notes 95–96; Berger, supra note 10, at 304 (“Many states’ 
refusal to disclose the details of their own procedures compounds the problem. As 
recently as October 2007, only six lethal injection states provided what Professor 
Denno termed ‘complete’ public protocols, and even those protocols did not give 
details about important information such as the qualifications and training of the 
execution team members. . . . Relatedly, states also routinely resist discovery in an 
effort to divulge as little information about the method by which they plan to 
execute . . . .”). 
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be states’ desire for secrecy regarding execution practices,” writes Debby 
Denno of the multitude of changes swirling around lethal injection. 
However problematic lethal injection might be, she says, “states are 
unwavering in their desire to conceal this disturbing reality from the 
public.”108  
In recent years, the problem has only grown worse. As several good 
government groups have noted, states in the last several years have 
“intensified their efforts to obscure information regarding the development 
and implementation of lethal injection protocols.”109 This move, as Eric 
Berger has noted, is largely a reflection of the fact that revealing such 
information would “highlight[] the failed processes and delegations by 
which the protocol was adopted.”110 Having seen for ourselves what those 
delegations and decision-making processes are, it only makes sense that 
DOCs would try to hide them. I would. Wouldn’t you?  
All this is to say that when it comes to transparency in the agency 
decision-making process, lethal injection turns the rules on their head. 
Instead of public disclosures, notice-and-comment procedures, and record-
keeping requirements, we see exemptions, obfuscation, and secrecy, 
rendering information about how a state DOC arrived at a lethal injection 
protocol notoriously hard to come by.  
The implications are profound. No transparency means no public 
scrutiny to trigger outrage over these decision-making processes so that 
democracy can do its thing. And no record-keeping or other rule-making 
requirements mean no processes for inmates to challenge, and no records by 
which courts can determine whether a DOC’s decision-making was 
 
108. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 
1331, 1382 (2014). 
109. THE CONST. PROJECT’S DEATH PENALTY COMM., IRREVERSIBLE ERROR: 
RECOMMENDED REFORMS FOR PREVENTING AND CORRECTING ERRORS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 141 (2014) (quoting Denno, supra note 
108, at 1382); Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution 
108B, supra note 106, at 1 (“[T]he past few years have been particularly 
noteworthy, as many states have increased efforts to cloak their execution 
procedures in secrecy. Many states have passed statutes that broaden the categories 
of information that will be kept confidential, exempting information about 
execution practices and procedures from public disclosure requirements and 
exempting departments of corrections from the public rulemaking requirements of 
administrative procedures act laws. The result of this troubling trend is that many 
jurisdictions have made secret information that may have once been readily 
available concerning their execution procedures, and other states are trying to do 
so. The American Bar Association is concerned about this movement toward 
increased secrecy and regressive policies surrounding the processes by which 
prisoners are executed by lethal injection, particularly given the gravity of the 
authority exercised by state and federal governments in the execution of 
prisoners.”). 
110. Berger, supra note 10, at 304. 
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arbitrary and capricious (and from what we know, there is a good chance 
that it was).111  
This, in turn, further entrenches problematic decision-making in the 
lethal injection context. Corrections department officials (and shadow, non-
DOC decision-makers) can design protocols without serious consideration 
of the issues that minimally competent decision-making requires.112 If no 
one knows what the DOC is doing, it can pretty much do what it wants. 
Lack of transparency is in large part how we got into this mess. And it is a 
large part of the reason we cannot manage to get out of it.  
CONCLUSION 
Having made three observations about how administrative law 
norms play out in the lethal injection context, I close with a few thoughts 
about the implications of my analysis. First are the implications for 
executions by lethal injection. Lethal injection today is more unreliable than 
at any other time in its forty-plus years of existence.113 Drug shortages have 
forced innovation, and innovation has led to problematic protocols. Botched 
executions have many causes, but problematic protocols and executioner 
incompetence are at the top of the list, and both lie at the feet of state 
DOCs. The perverse way that administrative law norms play out in the 
lethal injection context is partly to blame for this state of affairs. Torturous 
deaths at the hands of the state are a predictable result of the unlimited 
discretion that DOCs have to make decisions about matters decidedly 
outside their area of expertise, particularly when no one is watching.  
Next are the implications for the death penalty more broadly. As 
noted at the beginning of this essay, “death is different” is supposed to 
mean more protections for those subject to the ultimate punishment, more 
protections when the stakes are literally life and death. Yet where the 
rubber actually hits the road—where death sentences come to full fruition 
as state executions—the opposite is true. How can it be that where the death 
penalty is most concrete, the protections are most ephemeral? The way that 
administrative law norms work in the execution context speaks volumes 
 
111. For a strong argument that such obfuscation denies condemned inmates 
access to the courts and other due process guarantees, see Eric Berger, Lethal 
Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 
1367 (2014). 
112. See Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution 
108B, supra note 106, at 12 (“[P]rocedures that are created in secrecy and 
maintained without transparency are far more likely to be ill-conceived and poorly 
or inconsistently administered.”). 
113. See Denno, supra note 108, at 1380 (“The lethal injection procedure is 
more dangerous and inconsistent than ever, and the result is a perpetual effort by 
states to maintain secrecy at a time when transparency is most paramount.”). 
580 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 552 
about the strength of our commitment to ensuring that when the state takes 
life, it does its job right. 
Then there are the implications for administrative law. I am not an 
administrative law scholar. I came to administrative law because the death 
penalty brought me here—because administrative law is an integral part of 
the story of why executions by lethal injection in this country are so messed 
up. But even from an outsider’s view, it seems to me that a perverted 
version of death penalty exceptionalism is no better for administrative law 
than it is for the death penalty itself. The execution context shows state 
legislatures abdicating responsibility with blanket delegations of legislative 
power. And this apparently passes muster. It shows agency decision-
making that is breathtakingly incompetent, a reflection of the fact that 
DOCs have been delegated authority that is clearly and unequivocally 
outside their area of expertise. This, too, apparently passes muster. And it 
shows that despite all the talk about the importance of transparency and 
accountability in the agency decision-making process, in the end, that is all 
it is—talk.  
Administrative law scholars might soothe themselves with the fact 
that this is death penalty exceptionalism—oh that’s just how administrative 
norms play out when executions are at stake. But the way that 
administrative law norms work in the execution context also says 
something about the strength of our commitment to those norms more 
broadly. It shows that the bedrock principles and fundamental assumptions 
of administrative law can be suspended whenever the state wants.  Indeed, 
it shows that they can be suspended even when the state exercises its most 
awesome and consequential power—when the state takes human life.  
In the end, when the death penalty meets administrative law, 
administrative law norms get sullied and the death penalty loses the one 
comfort one might otherwise have: that when the state takes human life, it 
takes extra care to do it right. In the administrative law context, death 
penalty exceptionalism turns “death is different” on its head. And I cannot 
help but conclude, standing at the intersection of these two great bodies of 
law, that the result is not good for either.  
 
